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With an Even Hand: The Call for Pakistan’s 
Executive Task Force for Religious Tolerance 
Hon. J. Clifford Wallace* 
There are times when the right person is in the right position to 
cause a dramatic change in the course of the history of a country 
and its people’s rights. I believe, and others may also, one of those 
times was June 19, 2014. It was on this day that former Chief Justice 
Tassaduq Hussain Jillani of Pakistan filed his authored opinion on 
behalf of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, blazing a new trail  
in his country’s decades’ long struggle dealing with minority 
religious rights. 
It may seem odd that this has been such a problem in Pakistan. 
After all, Pakistan was divided off from India to protect the rights 
of the minority Muslims. Now, decades later, few are left of the 
courageous minority religion who were willing to divide a country 
to gain the freedom to practice peacefully their belief in Islam. As 
pointed out in Chief Justice Jillani’s opinion, “The protection of  
the freedom of religious belief and practice of all communities was 
indeed the predominant right asserted in several propositions and 
resolutions passed by the All India Muslim League,” and “the 
ide[o]logy underlying the Pakistan Movement was the creation of 
a separate nation state for the protection of the interests of the 
Muslim minority in India. . . . [T]he very genesis of our country is 
grounded in the protection of the religious rights of all, especially 
those of minorities.”1 
But Pakistan is not alone in the quest to be fair with minorities. 
It is an unfortunate frequent occurrence that majorities fail to pro-
vide appropriate safeguards for minority rights. It has happened in 
the United States of America. Perhaps observing this parallel 
	
*  Senior Judge and Chief Judge Emeritus United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit.  
 1. (2014)  S.M.C. No. 1 of 2014 (SC) paras. 2–13 (Pak.) (suo moto actions regarding 
suicide bomb attack of 22.9.2013 on the Church in Peshawar and regarding threats being 
given to Kalash tribe and Ismailies in Chitral), https://www.supremecourt.gov.pk/ 
downloads_judgements/smc_1_2014.pdf. 
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experience can be of help in the present situation in Pakistan after 
Chief Justice Jillani’s important opinion. 
I. 
The preamble to the 1973 Islamic Republic of Pakistan 
Constitution specifically directs that the principle of tolerance, “as 
enunciated by Islam, shall be fully observed.”2 
Thus, the courts of Pakistan, in keeping with their duty to 
protect and enforce the Constitution, are required to ensure 
tolerance is “fully observed.” 
Chief Justice Jillani rightly called to our attention in his address 
to the Karachi Bar Association in 2014 the words of the Pakistani 
founder when Mr. Muhammad Ali Jinnah first addressed the 
Constituent Assembly: 
You are free: you are free to go to your temples. You are free to go 
to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this State of 
Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed—that 
has nothing to do with the business of the State.3 
This foundational promise was powerfully reaffirmed by the 
Pakistan Supreme Court in its June 19, 2014, opinion, written by 
Chief Justice Jillani, reminding citizens that “the very genesis of our 
country is grounded in the protection of the religious rights of all, 
especially those of minorities,” and declaring that “[i]t is imperative 
that the right to freedom of religion be restored as an individual 
and indefeasible right.”4 
It is interesting to compare the similarities between the 
founding of Pakistan and the United States. Further insight can be 
drawn from comparing Justice Jillani’s opinion with the United 
States’ experience implementing court orders enforcing constitu-
tional rights that challenged existing societal views. Can these 
insights assist Pakistan through implementation of the Pakistan 
Supreme Court’s June 2014 order reaffirming the constitutional 
right to religious liberty for all? 
	
 2. PAKISTAN CONST. pmbl. 
 3. Justice Tassaduq Jillani, Speech at the High Court of Sindh (Feb. 27, 2014) (quoting 
President Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan  
(Aug. 11, 1947), http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/legislation/constituent_address_ 
11aug1947.html). 
 4. S.M.C. No. 1 of 2014, at paras. 9, 17. 
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Over 200 years ago, the United States of America was debating 
whether to accept our proposed Constitution. Religious tolerance 
became an issue. The result was the adoption of the first Ten 
Amendments after the Constitution was approved. The First 
Amendment prevented the Congress from adopting any legislation 
which would interfere with the free exercise of religion—meaning 
all religions: Islam, Judaism, Christianity, or others. Thus, the 
United States too has a similar constitutional requirement as to 
religious tolerance. 
There was an important religious tolerance requirement directed 
toward Islam when the Prophet Muhammad signed a document 
with a delegation from the St. Catherine Monastery, which included 
the following: 
Verily I, the servants, the helpers, and my followers defend them, 
because Christians are my citizens; and by Allah! I hold out 
against anything that displeases them. 
No compulsion is to be on them. 
Neither are their judges to be removed from their jobs nor their 
monks from their monasteries. 
No one is to destroy a house of their religion, to damage it, or to 
carry anything from it to Muslims’ houses. 
Should anyone take any of these [belongings], he would spoil 
God’s covenant and disobey His Prophet. Verily, they are my 
allies and have my secure charter . . . .5 
It is true that Pakistan has chosen through the democratic 
process to adopt Islam as a foundation of government. It appears 
from the words written in the St. Catherine Monastery document, 
however, that tolerance on religious issues is mandatory—that is, a 
Christian may freely practice his or her religion without interference 
so long as it does not violate the law of the land. 
Cases arise in all courts that challenge a religion or a religious 
practice. In the United States, we are guided by our First Amendment. 
In Pakistan, judges are guided by the preamble to the Constitution. 
	
 5. A. Zahoor & Z. Haq, Prophet Muhammad’s Charter of Privileges to Christians: Letter 
to the Monks of St. Catherine Monastery, ISLAMIC CIVILIZATION, www.cyberistan.org/ 
islamic/charter1.html (last visited Aug. 21, 2020). 
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Both require the same tolerance of religious belief and practice so 
long as it does not violate the duly enacted law of our countries. 
This brings me to the recent proceedings at the Supreme Court 
of Pakistan where the principle of religious tolerance was 
highlighted as a critical human right protected by Pakistan’s 
constitution—a right that the judiciary must take a proactive lead 
to promote. The opinion addressed a series of complaints in which 
religious minorities were abused and their places of worship 
attacked.6 Attacks on minority religious groups, and their places of 
worship, are protected by Pakistan’s blasphemy law, a provision of 
the penal code.7 In its decision, the Pakistan Supreme Court  
held that not only was relief necessary, but that the federal 
government must take steps to promote a culture of religious and 
social tolerance through law enforcement and education on a 
national scale. The court held that the anti-blasphemy laws protect 
all religions. 
Sometimes cases present difficult issues—such as whether to 
accommodate religions which use drugs as a sacrament.8 However, 
guidance on how to decide those issues stems not from our personal 
beliefs, but from our Constitution. Both the Pakistani and United 
States judiciaries are enjoined to be religiously tolerant. 
The result is that whether I am in San Diego or Islamabad, I am 
allowed to practice my religion. I highlight this point because religion 
excites so many in both our countries. Yet court decisions in 
Pakistan as well as the United States must show, by our 
constitutional direction, religious tolerance. This understanding 
assists the judiciary in promoting a culture of tolerance. 
II. 
Although the judicial branches of our countries may take the 
first step in elucidating and implementing constitutional directives 
through the issuance of orders, realization of the constitutional 
guarantees are often hindered by cultural or political resistance to 
those orders. As a result, successful implementation of court orders 
often relies on assistance from the executive or legislative branch of 
government. For example, in order to rectify the found constitutional 
	
 6. S.M.C. No. 1 of 2014, at paras. 2–8. 
 7. PAK. PENAL CODE 295-A. 
 8. See, e.g., Emp’t. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
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violation, the Supreme Court of Pakistan’s June 2014 order called 
for an Executive Task Force to develop a strategy of religious 
tolerance to meet the requirement of Pakistan’s 1973 Constitution.9 
The task force was to work to ensure that actions are taken to 
enforce minority rights and to educate law enforcement, judges, 
and Pakistan’s citizens on the right to liberty of conscience secured 
in its Constitution. The Supreme Court of Pakistan described what 
will be necessary to protect these rights and ensure compliance 
with its order. The court specifically mentioned, but did not limit 
its analysis to, the need for revised curricula in schools, 
discouragement of hate speech on social media, a National Council 
for minorities’ rights to monitor progress of the practical realization 
of these rights and safeguards, a Special Police Force to protect 
places of worship, and appropriate law enforcement to ensure the 
court’s judgment is carried into effect.10 
The court’s opinion seems to indicate that now is a critical time 
for Pakistan to engage its government and citizens in a galvanized 
movement to recognize the fundamental rights of religious minorities 
guaranteed by its own Constitution. I suggest that the declaration 
of the Supreme Court of Pakistan marks a watershed moment in 
the country’s history and development as a powerful nation in a 
globalized world of interdependence. But effective movement 
toward national religious tolerance, a value essential to Pakistan’s 
founders, will require government leadership. The required 
executive supervisory task force can implement the court’s 
direction in a comprehensive and evenhanded manner for all of 
Pakistan’s people. 
Change will not happen overnight as a result of one court order, 
but the Pakistan Supreme Court’s recent decision, if supported and 
guided by the required Executive Task Force, will likely provide 
the necessary catalyst to accomplish lasting reform. An Executive 
Task Force would oversee efforts in all sectors—education, media, 
law enforcement, places of worship—and would monitor the 
progress of those efforts throughout the country.11 Although 
implementing an edict of the judicial branch is often a difficult task 
	
 9. S.M.C. No. 1 of 2014, at para. 37. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
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in any diverse nation, it has been done successfully when supported 
by the will of the people and the rule of law. 
The Pakistan Supreme Court’s order cites a case decided by the 
United States Supreme Court in 1954, Brown v. Board of Education of 
Topeka.12 That case called upon the government to protect minority 
rights as guaranteed by the United States Constitution. In this 
instance, the Court interpreted the Constitution’s right to equal 
protection under the law to require racially integrated public school 
systems. Implementation of that judicial decree, however, required 
the support of the United States Congress, the President, and 
federal law enforcement agencies to ensure that the Court’s ruling 
would have full force and effect in those geographical areas where 
the ruling contradicted centuries-long cultural mores, which 
viewed racial segregation as the natural order. 
Although Brown concerned constitutional protection for racial 
minorities, its principles are analogous to other social minorities—
even religious minorities. The Pakistan Supreme Court recognized 
this in its reliance on Brown.13 Indeed, Pakistan’s 1973 Constitution, 
together with its amendments, was ratified by Pakistan’s Parliament 
and became the supreme law of the land. Pakistan’s Constitution 
grants equal protection of the rights of conscience to all citizens of 
all religious persuasions.14 The Pakistan Supreme Court’s June 2014 
order recites these constitutional protections and calls for the 
federal government to act to enforce the rights to freedom of 
individual and community religious tolerance and freedoms.15 As 
the United States’ Brown v. Board of Education decision demon-
strates, a supreme court may decree, but the rest of the country’s 
government must carry out the court’s judgment to make a lasting 
impact. Thus, the United States’ experience under Brown has some 
relevance to Pakistan’s upcoming experience with the religious 
tolerance opinion. 
B. 
The civil rights movement in the United States was highlighted 
by the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education, but 
	
 12. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 13.  See S.M.C. No. 1 of 2014, at para. 30. 
 14. PAKISTAN CONST. arts. 20, 25. 
 15.  S.M.C. No. 1 of 2014, at paras. 10–12.  
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did not end there. That case concerned equal education rights for 
school children, but the judgment taught a principle of equal 
treatment for minorities beyond the scope of America’s schools. 
The thrust of the Court’s decision called attention to the need for a 
fundamental change in the socioeconomic structure and political 
atmosphere of American society that could ensure equal rights for 
all races. It was a turning point, especially for certain geographical 
regions, where communities had long-standing practices of racial 
segregation and separate, unequal public facilities for different races. 
Those communities were resistant to change. To implement the 
Supreme Court’s directive, more than a court order was needed. 
The support of the United States’ President and Congress, the 
sword and purse of the country,16 were needed to oversee those 
changes not only to integrate racial minorities into historically 
white schools, but also to begin the process to ensure that racial 
minorities were afforded equal opportunity in other public 
accommodations as well. In other words, the executive and 
legislative branches of national government, armed with a 
comprehensive strategy, were needed to ensure full acceptance of 
the court’s guarantee. 
Although many communities and schools followed the Court’s 
directive peacefully, others resisted. This resistance, in some cases, 
was violent, despite the Supreme Court’s directive. As a result, the 
Court’s order was not immediately enforceable in many 
communities, and others were hesitant to proceed. After one year 
of confusion and inaction, the Court issued a second opinion in 
Brown v. Board of Education to deliver a more directive strategy to 
implement its edict.17 
The impact of Brown v. Board of Education was not limited to 
racial integration in public schools. The Court’s order struck at the 
heart of longstanding cultural discrimination that impinged upon 
constitutional guarantees. This could not be resolved overnight. It 
took time, work, and the influence of the executive and legislative 
leadership to ensure that protection for minorities would endure. 
The effort continues today. 
	
 16. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 17. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
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Perhaps the example of the United States’ progress in this area 
can inform the movement for religious tolerance that is beginning 
in Pakistan. Even when presented with legal authority, acceptance 
of change at the individual and community levels requires a 
comprehensive strategy and the full backing of a nation’s govern-
ment to implement it. Based on the United States’ experience, a 
Pakistan Executive Task Force will play a key role in implementing 
the constitutional guarantee of freedom of religious conscience and 
observance in Pakistan following the June 2014 Pakistan Supreme 
Court decision. 
As was the case after Brown, Pakistan will confront some 
difficulties in implementing the June 2014 order. For many 
communities, it will affect a cultural paradigm shift that likely will 
struggle for acceptance even with the support of an Executive Task 
Force to support and monitor progress toward religious tolerance. 
Pakistan has a law that prohibits blasphemy against any religion. 
Historically, the law has not been enforced to protect the views or 
practices of religious minorities. Following an attack on a Christian 
church, as discussed in the court’s June 2014 order, police conceded 
that it believed the law did not protect from attack or desecration 
places of worship for religious minorities.18 A common view was 
that the blasphemy law only applies to attacks on Islam.19 Even 
though the law was made clear by the Supreme Court of Pakistan, 
the prevailing misunderstanding will take time to correct. It is 
difficult to reconcile a common view that attacks on religious 
minorities are not blasphemous, although they were indeed unlawful 
under the Pakistan Penal Code, with constitutional provisions that 
require liberty of religious belief for all citizens. 
Like the United States, Pakistan was founded on values that 
embraced religious diversity. At the time of Pakistan’s founding, 
the Muslim faith was a minority in India, so protections for liberty 
of belief and worship for all religious minorities took center stage 
in the framing of Pakistan’s Constitution. Although today Islam is 
the primary religion in Pakistan, where it enjoys a special status 
both in practice and politics, it should not be overlooked that 
Pakistan became an independent nation following a movement to 
	
 18. S.M.C. No. 1 of 2014, at para. 8. 
 19. Id. at paras. 8–9. 
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protect a religious minority—the Muslim minority in northern India 
in the early twentieth century. Pakistan’s founders intended to form 
a country that would be tolerant of all religious beliefs. Pakistan is 
an Islamic nation that can strive for religious tolerance. Such a 
course will strengthen Pakistan’s government, its citizens, and its 
place in a globalized world that so often struggles to accommodate 
religious diversity. It is clear from the court’s June 2014 order that 
government and law enforcement agencies are not fully informed 
of the Constitution’s protections for religious minorities, or they are 
unable to enforce them in some cases due to societal pressures. 
Education and training will be a critical aspect of the Executive 
Task Force’s strategy for religious tolerance. Training is necessary 
for local leaders and law enforcement agencies, particularly in 
regard to desecrators of places of worship and unlawful attacks on 
minorities that have long gone without penalty because govern-
ment officials believed it to be legally permissible. Education is 
critical not only for those in leadership, but in Pakistan’s schools 
where an unbiased curriculum will be a great step forward for the 
country’s future. 
A central Executive Task Force can bring local organizations 
together to address issues of religious freedom that are uniform—
or varied—across the country. The court’s order provides 
additional direction that will allow Pakistan to take a step forward, 
and the efforts toward these goals are essential for religious 
tolerance. A National Council for Minority Rights will monitor 
progress, and a special police force will protect places of worship 
of religious minorities.20 
III. 
It is a critical time for Pakistan to show its respect and support 
for its apex court and the Constitution it follows. Pakistan can be a 
leader in a region of the world that has had religious diversity for 
thousands of years, yet tolerance for religious minorities has 
weakened and led to ongoing struggles for independence and 
peace. If a country’s people are continually exposed to judicial 
outcomes without force due to political or financial pressures, lack 
of tolerance, or other illegitimate influences, they will not expect to 
be treated fairly when bringing their complaints to the judicial 
	
 20. Id. at para. 37.  
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system. Corruption in, and distrust of, the legal system will breed 
more of the same. When the public perceives that either the govern-
ment or those individuals or groups who are favored by the 
government are receiving special treatment from the judiciary, the 
government and judiciary lose authority. Particularly in a republic, 
the government is legitimated by the support of its people. A 
judiciary that does not independently review the actions of the 
other branches detracts from the people’s belief in their government’s 
legitimacy. As United States constitutional supporter Alexander 
Hamilton stated, “where the will of the legislature, declared in its 
statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people, declared in the 
Constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the latter rather 
than the former.”21 The strictures placed on the government by the 
Constitution are meaningless if the branch that is to determine 
whether actions are within those limits is not supported and 
followed by its political leadership. 
In countries seeking to develop or strengthen an independent 
judiciary, the public must be made aware of both the move toward 
and need for judicial independence. In order to raise public 
awareness, occurrences of the judiciary fairly meting out justice 
with tolerance to all who come before it should be publicized. In 
order to demonstrate that the country’s laws apply fairly and 
equally to all, the public should be informed when bringing to 
account the government officials who are corrupt or otherwise 
violate the law. Focusing on making the judiciary more indepen-
dent assists in creating a culture of tolerance and promotes 
religious tolerance. 
Thus, the action of the executive and legislative powers in 
Pakistan in response to the Pakistan Supreme Court’s June 2014 
order is vital not only for the issue of the case, but also for showing 
the support for and response to the constitutionally based direction. 
Citizens’ desire for religious tolerance will be heightened if 
citizens can expect timely justice when the judicial process is used 
to resolve conflicts. Pakistan can deliver justice by carrying out the 
Pakistan Supreme Court’s June 2014 order to ensure that protections 
for religious minorities, both in religious belief and worship and in 
representation, are observed and enforced. As clearly stated in the 
1973 Pakistan Constitution, “the right to religious conscience is  
	
 21. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
004.WALLACE_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/25/20  11:53 AM 
69 With an Even Hand 
	 79 
	
a right equally granted to all citizens, religious denominations  
and sects.”22 
IV. 
But what is the benefit to the majority of Pakistan’s citizens if 
the government follows the Pakistan Supreme Court’s directions 
and minority religious rights are protected? One such benefit is the 
promotion of democratic values. 
There are many ways in which the free exercise of religion can 
invigorate and reinforce democratic government. We may glean 
some insights on how to realize these benefits by examining briefly 
the views of the Founders of the United States Constitution. I will 
then turn to some of the challenges we all face in ensuring that 
diverse individuals can choose, embrace, or altogether reject 
different religions. I propose a simple metaphor—the public square. 
 As I see it, religious freedom and democracy go hand in hand; 
each strengthens and reinforces the other in several ways. First, 
many believe the free exercise of religion can promote a more 
humanitarian, tolerant society. For example, most religions teach 
the importance of a power greater than one’s self. The very nature 
of this belief puts an adherent in a position where he or she believes 
that the beginning and end of all creation, and the importance of 
life, transcend individual needs and wants.23 As one comes to 
understand that others are equally subordinated, there is a greater 
likelihood of involvement with other members of society. One can 
become more attuned to the horizontal equality that knits a 
community together, as well as the vertical belief in a higher power 
which instills a sense of humility. This “turning out” phenomenon 
increases the possibility of genuine concern for others and is 
important to a society which cares for those in need.24 
	
 22. S.M.C. No. 1 of 2014, at para. 11.  
 23. See Frederick Mark Gedicks & Roger Hendrix, Democracy, Autonomy, and Values: 
Some Thoughts on Religion and Law in Modern America, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1579, 1588 (1987) 
(“The religious link between the mundane here and now of physical existence and the 
possibility of a transcendent, enduring reality beyond, instills in many religious people the 
desire and duty to improve their own lot and that of their fellows by suggesting the moral 
possibilities of a better way of living, and by cultivating respect for the law, including a 
greater willingness to restrict one’s own choices and actions to benefit others. Thus, religious 
consciousness is an important positive influence on the substance of societal values.”). 
 24. In addition to the individual “turning out” effect, religious institutions also provide 
various humanitarian services.  See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 687 (1970) 
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Second, most religions—but not all—promote civic virtue and 
influence believers to be law abiding.25 Democratic societies 
generally function because the vast majority of people are willing 
to obey the law without enforcement action by the state.26 Even if 
possible, it does not make sense to allocate limited government 
resources to a police force capable of enforcing all laws in a non-
law abiding society. Allowing, without impediment, people to 
exercise religious beliefs which tend to encourage acceptance of 
legal norms can therefore further a law-abiding culture, which is 
essential to democracy.27 
Third, religious freedom preserves an important opportunity 
for choice, which is a key component of liberty. When each religious 
community is free to proclaim its tenets and teach others, there will 
be a wider landscape of varying religious views and a broader 
spectrum of choices. As a result, each individual has a greater 
opportunity to make a choice that best fits his or her personal needs. 
Religious freedom is therefore both an important end in itself as 
well as one of the cornerstones of self-determination, individual 
choice, and pluralism.28 There is a profound liberty interest in being 
	
(Brennan, J., concurring) (observing that religious organizations “contribute to the well-
being of the community in a variety of nonreligious ways, and thereby bear burdens that 
would otherwise either have to be met by general taxation, or be left undone, to the detriment 
of the community”). 
 25. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 222 (1972) (“[T]his record strongly shows 
that the Amish community has been a highly successful social unit within our society, even 
if apart from the conventional ‘mainstream.’  Its members are productive and very law-
abiding members of society . . . .”). 
 26. President John Adams remarked, “[W]e have no government armed with power 
capable of contending with human passions unbridled by morality and religion.” DAVID 
BARTON, ORIGINAL INTENT 319 (3d ed. 2000); see also, Gedicks & Hendrix, supra note 23, at 
1595 (“Because even a relatively small number of dissenters can render law enforcement 
ineffective, an overwhelming majority of persons must be willing voluntarily to restrict their 
personal choices and actions to those not prohibited by law if law is to have significant force 
and effect.”). 
 27. In the words of Benjamin Franklin, “[O]nly a virtuous people are capable of 
freedom. As nations become corrupt and vicious, they have more need of masters.” BARTON, 
supra note 26, at 321. 
 28. See Michael E. Smith, The Special Place of Religion in the Constitution, 1983 SUP. CT. 
REV. 83, 10–08, for a discussion of personal freedom as a justification for the special 
constitutional treatment of religion. See also Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) 
at 12–13 (1993), http://www.echr.coe.int (“[F]reedom of thought, conscience and religion is 
one of the foundations of a ‘democratic society’ within the meaning of the Convention [for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms]. It is, in its religious dimension, 
one of the most vital elements that go to make up the identity of believers and their 
conception of life, but it is also a precious asset for atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the 
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able to choose something as fundamental and personal as religion.29 
Thus, with freedom to thrive, religions can help elevate the political 
process in society to a higher plane of democracy and individual 
freedom.30 It can also lead to a more stable society because freedom 
to choose a religion which best fits individual needs will result in a 
more satisfied society.31 
Finally, just as our collective viewpoint is enriched by ethnic 
and racial diversity, so too can diversity in religious cultures 
contribute to our political and social discourse.32 It is important to 
consider diverse perspectives in dealing with new challenges 
facing our society. 
	
unconcerned. The pluralism indissociable from a democratic society, which has been dearly 
won over the centuries, depends on it.”). 
 29. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 461 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring) (“By its nature, religion—in the comprehensive sense in which the Constitution 
uses that word—is an aspect of human thought and action which profoundly relates the life 
of man to the world in which he lives.”); Gedicks & Hendrix, supra note 23, at 1602. 
 30. “Respect for the exercise of conscience and religion is a fundamental aspect of a 
universal understanding of human rights.” Orrin G. Hatch, Religious Liberty at Home and 
Abroad: Reflections on Protecting This Fundamental Freedom, 2001 BYU L. REV. 413, 413–14. 
 31. See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (1689), reprinted in TWO 
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 211, 230–32 (Ian 
Shapiro ed., 2003) (recognizing that the legitimacy and stability of a political regime can be 
enhanced by tolerating a range of religious outlooks); cf. THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6–9 (1970) (positing that in a democratic society, the system of 
freedom of expression is based on, inter alia, the principle that freedom of expression is 
essential as a means of assuring individual self-fulfillment and is a method of achieving a 
more adaptable, stable community). 
 32. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 689 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) 
(“[R]eligious organizations . . . uniquely contribute to the pluralism of American society by 
their religious activities. . . [E]ach group contributes to the diversity of association, 
viewpoint, and enterprise essential to a vigorous, pluralistic society.”); Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 
374 U.S. 203, 306 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (“[M]any of our legal, political and 
personal values derive historically from religious teachings.”); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 
141, 150 (1943) (Murphy, J., concurring) (“[U]nity and strength are best accomplished, not by 
enforced orthodoxy of views, but by diversity of opinion through the fullest possible 
measure of freedom of conscience and thought.”); Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to Belonging: The 
Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C. L. REV. 303, 336 (1986) (“Today’s constitutional 
doctrines of equal citizenship, freedom of religion, and freedom of expression mediate 
cultural conflict by opening our public life to the participation of cultural minorities. By 
defending against cultural subordination and the coercion of cultural conformity, the same 
doctrines also promote tolerance for cultural difference. Together, these guarantees promise 
individuals broad freedom to choose for themselves among ‘the varieties of ethnic 
experience.’”). 
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The challenges facing religious freedom will vary among 
countries and regions based on differences in culture, history, 
structure of government, and myriad other factors. The experience 
of the United States provides one of many possible examples of 
these challenges, which I briefly discuss here only for comparative 
purposes. 
The success of the United States Constitution as an authoritative 
document of governance can be observed by the fact that it has now 
existed for more than 200 years, the longest life of any written 
constitution in the history of the world.33 Perhaps looking at the 
views of the Founders of the Constitution can shed light on why 
even today U.S. citizens feel religious freedom is so integral to the 
social and political fabric of their nation, as well as inform them 
about the challenges to religious freedom that have nonetheless 
been a part of their nation’s history. 
The Founders sought to protect the important societal and indi-
vidual values of free religion in part by means of the Establishment 
Clause: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion.”34 As I have explained elsewhere, the Founders’ primary 
concern was to prevent the establishment of a dominant religion, 
the power of which would squelch the voice of smaller religions.35 
They did not create an impenetrable wall to prevent any relations 
between government and religion. Nowhere in the Constitution are 
the words “separation of church and state” to be found.36 However, 
subsequent misinterpreters of the Constitution and its Founders 
have embraced the now-proverbial “separation of church and 
	
 33. See, e.g., David A. J. Richards, Constitutional Legitimacy and Constitutional Privacy, 
61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 800, 811 (1986). 
 34. U.S. CONST. amend. I.  This prohibition has been enforced against the States by 
incorporation of the First Amendment into the due process guarantee of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (“The First Amendment 
declares that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the 
legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact such laws.”). 
 35. J. Clifford Wallace, The Framers’ Establishment Clause: How High the Wall?, 2001 BYU 
L. REV. 755, 769. 
 36. Id. at 756 & n.16 (“[N]one of the twenty drafts of the religion clauses generated by 
the state ratification process and the First Congress contained this or similar phrases.”). 
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state,”37 and some advocate a government that is indifferent to the 
role of religion in our society.38 
It has been argued, and history seems to support the argument, 
that the Establishment Clause was not meant to be interpreted as 
anti-religious, but only as a prohibition on preferential treatment 
for a particular church.39 I believe former Chief Justice of the United 
States William Rehnquist has the better of the argument on this 
issue when he wrote in his dissent in an Establishment Clause case: 
The evil to be aimed at, so far as those who spoke [during the 
First Congress’ debates on the First Amendment] were concerned, 
appears to have been the establishment of a national church, and 
perhaps the preference of one religious sect over another; but it 
was definitely not concerned about whether the Government 
might aid all religions evenhandedly.40 
It is true that in a letter to a small religious group, Thomas 
Jefferson, in the later years of his life, did state that the 
Establishment Clause erected “a wall of separation between church 
and state.”41 But as I have argued elsewhere, there can be no 
“legislative history” from this statement as Mr. Jefferson was out of 
the country at the time the amendments were debated and 
adopted.42 Indeed, his earlier history demonstrates, and his actions 
verify, that he did not embrace a governmental position of anti-
	
 37. See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (“The First Amendment has 
erected a wall between church and state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We 
could not approve the slightest breach.”); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 686 (2002) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Whenever we remove a brick from the wall that was designed to 
separate religion and government, we increase the risk of religious strife and weaken the 
foundation of our democracy.”). 
 38. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 607 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“When the 
government arrogates to itself a role in religious affairs, it abandons its obligation as 
guarantor of democracy.”). 
 39. See, e.g., PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 14–15 (2002); 
Wallace, supra note 35, at 756. The First Amendment has often been understood to limit 
religious freedom in ways never imagined by the late eighteen-century dissenters who 
demanded constitutional guarantees of religious liberty. Not least, the dissenters sought the 
First Amendment and other constitutional provisions to prevent government from 
discriminating on account of religious differences. See Wallace, supra note 35, at 756. 
 40. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 99 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 41. HAMBURGER, supra note 39, at 161. See also id. at 155–62 for a discussion of the 
historical context of Jefferson’s letter to the Danbury Baptist Association. 
 42. Wallace, supra note 35, at 767–68. 
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religion; rather, he merely conditioned government assistance on 
equal access by all sects.43 
Thus, the Establishment Clause was not meant to be anti-
religious. It was adopted only to be sure that no national religion 
was established and that no preferential treatment would be given 
to a particular church. At its inception, there was no “wall of 
separation” but rather a principle of encouraging religion without 
discrimination. By the First Amendment, Congress was enjoined 
from “prohibiting the free exercise” of religion. With no nationally 
recognized religion and a prohibition on governmental interference 
with and discrimination against different religious practices, 
freedom of religion would have the fertile ground it needs to thrive. 
This dilemma is worth highlighting because it illustrates one of 
the challenges faced by all societies, namely, the difficulty of 
drawing a sensible line between establishing religion and wiping it 
out of the public sphere altogether. I suggest the Founders embraced 
a position in between these two points: non-discriminatory 
encouragement of all religions. Reasonable minds can certainly 
differ on precisely where the line should be drawn in particular 
cases, and much of the debate about the role of religion vis-à-vis 
government boils down to this fundamental question. 
B. 
With this background, we can turn to assessing how well a 
nation has been strengthening and protecting the free exercise of 
diverse religious cultures. One measure of a country’s success is 
how well it treats all religions and how freely its people are able to 
openly practice their beliefs. In this regard, our focus can be more 
precise. I propose examination of the extent to which a country has 
nurtured free exercise of religion by focusing on whether it has 
promoted freedom in the public square. 
In earlier days, and to some extent still, communities had a 
block of land in the center of the city where open communication 
and debate would occur. Hyde Park Corner in London, England, is 
	
 43. See id. at 768; cf., HAMBURGER, supra note 39, at 181 (“After writing to the Danbury 
Baptist Association in 1802, Jefferson himself apparently did not again directly advocate 
separation. He continued to denounce the union of church and state, but he seems not to 
have expressly urged separation. For example, when . . . he denounced political preaching 
in 1815, he did not do so in terms of the separation of church and state.”). 
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a good example.44 If we visited the town squares of the various 
Pakistani communities, would we find religions free to advance 
their causes openly without fear of government interference? Does 
freedom of religion grow and develop in the town square 
unmolested by dominant religions? 
Perhaps some specific questions might assist our dialogue: 
1. Can all churches proffer their religious beliefs? 
2. Are all religions treated equally by the state? 
3. Can religious groups teach others their beliefs openly 
and encourage acceptance? 
4. Are there government restrictions on open and free 
religious dialogue? 
5. Are there restrictions on the distribution of written 
materials used to explain one’s religious views, or can 
these materials be distributed freely? 
6. Are there visa restrictions placed on visitors entering the 
country who wish to teach religion? 
After identifying restrictions on religion, we should ask whether 
they are arguably justified and weigh the importance of free exercise 
against other societal goals. For example: 
1. Does a religion adopt terrorism as a tenet or practice of 
its sect, or does it advocate violation of generally 
accepted criminal laws? 
2. Does a religion teach concepts that are in violation of 
basic human rights? 
3. Is a restriction on religion necessary to ensure that 
others can freely exercise their religious beliefs or is it 
aimed at silencing unwanted religious views? 
Clearly, a sensible approach to promoting religious freedom 
must be principled, pragmatic, and flexible, but with a keen eye 
toward ferreting out pretextual restrictions which are designed to 
suppress unpopular religious beliefs. In this respect, specific “town 
square” questions may help us focus on particular restrictions on 
	
 44. See Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91 
CALIF. L. REV. 439, 488 (2003) (“The ideal of the public forum suggests a place where citizens 
can congregate, air their grievances, debate public policy, and be confronted with new 
thoughts and arguments. Archetypal public forums include the Athenian Senate and Hyde 
Park’s Speaker’s Corner, and the myth of their influence and importance is hard to dispel.”). 
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religion, and then critically evaluate these restrictions in order to 
determine whether they are justifiable.45 Furthermore, by focusing 
on specific facets of free exercise in the public square, we can 
develop a general sense of where a nation has drawn the line 
between establishing a national religion, tolerating all religions 
equally, and, at the other end of the spectrum, wiping all religion 
out of the public square. 
C. 
Applying this “public square” inquiry, we can now turn to 
identifying and evaluating some of the obstacles to free exercise. By 
way of example, I call to your attention two specific challenges—
the view that religious pluralism must be suppressed in order to 
promote a more stable society, and the stifling influence of a 
dominant religion. Two cases decided by the European Court of 
Human Rights are illustrative, and I discuss each in turn. 
1. 
First, in Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova, the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights considered whether the Moldovan 
authorities’ refusal to recognize the Metropolitan Church of 
Bessarabia unlawfully infringed on freedom of religion and asso-
ciation, in violation of Article 9 of the Convention for the Protection 
	
 45. Compare, for example, the analysis of the European Court of Human Rights in 
Serif v. Greece, App. No. 38178/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1999). In that case, Serif claimed his 
conviction for “usurping the functions of a minister of a ‘known religion’ and publicly 
wearing the dress of such a minister amounted to a violation of his rights” under Article 9 of 
the Convention for the Protection of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, id. at 1; which 
provides that 
[f]reedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in 
the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, 
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
Convention for the Protection of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms art. 9, Nov. 4, 1950, Eur. 
T.S. 
The court reasoned that while 
[i]t is true that in a democratic society it may be necessary to place restrictions on 
freedom of religion to reconcile the interests of the various religious groups . . . 
any such restriction must correspond to a ‘pressing social need’ and must be 
‘proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.’ 
Serif, App. No. 38178/97 at 11. After weighing the competing interests at stake in the case, 
the court concluded that Serif’s Article 9 rights had been violated. Id. at 12. 
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of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Convention).46 
Pursuant to Moldova’s Religious Denominations Act, only 
religions recognized by the government could be practiced.47 
The government contended, among other things, that because 
the Republic of Moldova had only been recognized as an indepen-
dent state since 1991, it “had few strengths it could depend on to 
ensure its continued existence, but one factor conducive to stability 
was religion, the majority of the population being Orthodox 
Christians.”48 Therefore, the government argued, if the Metropolitan 
Church of Bessarabia was officially recognized the “tie was likely 
to be lost and the Orthodox Christian population dispersed among 
a number of Churches.”49 
The court recognized that protection of public order was a 
legitimate aim, but it nonetheless held: 
[T]he Court considers that the refusal to recognise the applicant 
Church has such consequences for the applicants’ freedom of 
religion that it cannot be regarded as proportionate to the legitimate 
aim pursued or, accordingly, as necessary in a democratic society, 
and that there has a been a violation of Article 9 of the Convention.50 
The court also stated that “the role of the authorities . . . is not 
to remove the cause of tension by eliminating pluralism, but to 
ensure that the competing groups tolerate each other.”51 
Thus, one challenge facing religious freedom is the belief that 
religious pluralism will lead to societal instability. Proponents of 
this view contend that if there are fewer choices—or perhaps only 
one choice—there will be fewer or no differences in religious views, 
thus resulting in a more stable society.52 But put in context, such 
	
 46. Metro. Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova, App. No. 45701/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2002). 
 47. Id. at 24. In addition to being unable to practice their religion, unrecognized 
churches could not defend their rights in the courts. As a result, members of the Metropolitan 
Church of Bessarabia were unable to defend themselves against physical attacks and 
persecution, and the Church could not protect its assets. Id. at 29–30. 
 48. Id. at 25. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 32. 
 51. Id. at 27. 
 52. See also, Serif v. Greece, App. No. 38178/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1999) (the government 
contended that “the authorities had to intervene in order to avoid the creation of tension 
among the Muslims in Rodopi and between the Moslems and the Christians of the area as 
well as Greece and Turkey”); Buscarini v. San Marino, 6 B.H.R.C. 638, 9 (1999) (members of 
Parliament required to take an oath on the Holy Gospels, and government attempted to 
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instability is an unavoidable aspect of democracy. Democratic elec-
tions cause instability, and even when a political leader is 
democratically elected, various voices strongly advocate their 
positions, and there are ordinarily adherents in more than one camp. 
This instability and pluralism is a basic value within a democratic 
society;53 it is the liberty interest of choice which is the basis of 
democracy.54 Accordingly, it is important to ask why religious 
differences should be singled out for discrimination.55 With so 
much natural and expected instability in a democratic society, how 
can special restrictions on religion be justified? 
2. 
Yet another obstacle to religious freedom was at issue in 
Kokkinakis v. Greece.56 Article 13 of the Constitution of Greece 
provides: “There shall be freedom to practise [sic] any known 
religion; individuals shall be free to perform their rites of worship 
without hindrance and under the protection of the law. The 
performance of rites of worship must not prejudice public order or 
public morals. Proselytism is prohibited.”57 
	
justify this requirement by arguing the oath was needed to “preserve public order, in the 
form of social cohesion and the citizens’ trust in their traditional institutions”). 
 53. As one commentator has remarked, rather than assuming that instability is 
undesirable, “[w]e should instead be fostering dissent, and we should be recognizing that 
religious dissent has much to contribute to the creation of a more progressive society.” 
Steven Shiffrin, Propter Honoris Respectum: Religion and Democracy, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1631, 1634 (1999). See also, THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (“In a free government 
the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights. It consists in the one 
case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other in the multiplicity of sects. The degree 
of security in both cases will depend on the number of interests and sects.”); LOCKE, supra 
note 31, at 40–41 (“It is not the diversity of opinions (which cannot be avoided), but the 
refusal of toleration to those that are of different opinions (which might have been granted), 
that has produced all the bustles and wars that have been in the Christian world upon 
account of religion.”). 
 54. See J. Clifford Wallace, The Jurisprudence of Judicial Restraint: A Return to the 
Moorings, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 5 (1981) (“[T]he same respect for human autonomy that 
underlies liberty underlies democracy as well and establishes its intrinsic value.”). 
 55. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 28, at 97 (suggesting many of the most divisive social 
issues have not involved religion, such as “the completion of industrial unionization in the 
late 1930s; McCarthyism in the early 1950s; the campaign for racial equality from the middle 
1950s onward; prolongation of the Vietnam War; and perhaps the Watergate scandal”). 
 56. Kokkinakis v. Greece, App. No. 14307/88, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1994). 
 57. Id. at 6. 
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Interestingly, the European Court of Human Rights observed 
that the ban on proselyting was originally enacted after the 
Orthodox Church, “which had long complained of a Bible society’s 
propaganda directed at young Orthodox schoolchildren on behalf 
of the Evangelical Church, managed to get a clause added to the 
first Constitution (1844) forbidding ‘proselytism and any other 
action against the dominant religion.’”58 This ban was eventually 
codified as a criminal offense.59 
Kokkinakis was a Jehovah’s Witness who visited the home of a 
woman whose husband was a cantor at a local Orthodox church, 
and Kokkinakis engaged in a discussion with her about religion. He 
was convicted of proselytism after a criminal court determined that 
Kokkinakis 
attempted to proselytize and, directly or indirectly, to intrude on 
the religious beliefs of Orthodox Christians, with the intention of 
undermining those beliefs, by taking advantage of their 
inexperience, their low intellect, and their naïvety. In particular, 
[he] went to the home of [Mrs Kyriakaki] . . . and told her that they 
brought good news; by insisting in a pressing manner, they 
gained admittance to the house and began to read from a book on 
the Scriptures which they interpreted with reference to a king of 
heaven, to events which had not yet occurred but would occur, 
etc., encouraging her by means of their judicious, skilful [sic] 
explanations . . . to change her Orthodox Christian beliefs.60 
In considering whether Kokkinakis’ conviction violated Article 
9 of the Convention, the European Court of Human Rights 
distinguished between “bearing Christian witness and improper 
proselytism.”61 Whereas “[t]he former corresponds to true 
evangelism, which a report . . . describes as an essential mission and 
a responsibility of every Christian and every Church,” improper 
proselytism entails, for example, “exerting improper pressure on 
people in distress or in need,” “offering material or social 
advantages” to gain new members, or even “the use of violence or 
	
 58. Id. at 7. 
 59. Id. at 7. 
 60. Id. at 3–4 (omissions in original). The criminal court sentenced Kokkinakis to four 
months’ imprisonment, which was convertible into a pecuniary penalty, as well as a fine of 
10,000 drachmas. The court also ordered the confiscation and destruction of four booklets 
that Kokkinakis had been hoping to sell. Id. 
 61. Id. at 16. 
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brainwashing.”62 The court concluded that the Greek courts had 
failed to specify how Kokkinakis’ proselytizing was improper, and, 
therefore, his conviction violated Article 9.63 
This case illustrates how governments may be influenced by a 
dominant church to impose restrictions on minority religions.64 The 
motivation of the dominant church is not benign: it wishes to 
eliminate competition. When a church achieves monopoly power, 
it is in a position to restrict and, in some cases, eliminate less 
powerful religious organizations. 
Similar problems of monopoly arise in the context of capitalism 
and market control. While it is true that economic monopolies can 
provide certain services and have some advantages, experience has 
demonstrated that the free enterprise system is far more valuable 
in providing the best climate for economic growth, consumer 
satisfaction, and individual prosperity. There are examples of 
countries that have made the dynamic swing from central 
organization (government monopoly) to the free enterprise system, 
with resulting benefits and economic progression for its citizens. 
Likewise, when a religious monopoly has the strength to 
squelch other religious views, it diminishes or eliminates the 
growth opportunities for religions generally. Just as some 
regulation is necessary to ensure the smooth operation of markets, 
so it may be necessary for the government to enforce a few ground 
rules in order to keep the public square in good repair and the 
marketplace of ideas vibrant. However, when a dominant religion 
monopolizes the public square, the opportunity for individual 
choice, the cross-fertilization of ideas, and other benefits of a 
religiously diverse democracy are jeopardized. Thus, just as 
economic monopolies can ultimately undermine capitalism, so too 
can religious monopolies weaken democracy. 
The influence of a dominant religion and government concerns 
about stability are but two of the many obstacles to religious 
freedom today. Other examples include: 
	
 62. Id. at 16–17. 
 63. Id. at 17. 
 64. See also, id. at 6 (Article 3 of the Constitution of Greece provides that “[t]he 
dominant religion in Greece is that of the Christian Eastern Orthodox Church”); 
Manoussakis v. Greece, App. No. 18748/91, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1997) (The Greek Orthodox 
Church made a complaint about the use of a room by Jehovah’s Witnesses and a prosecution 
was instituted for establishing and operating a place of religious worship without 
authorization from the proper authorities). 
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1. Government refusal to recognize religions; 
2. Restrictions on the availability of visas for religious 
missionaries; 
3. Unnecessary restrictions on building houses of worship; 
4. Governmental designation of a religion as a “sect” and 
imposing special restrictions on “sects”; and 
5. Discrimination against religions with headquarters in a 
different country. 
D. 
How does a member of a dominant religion or a non-believer in 
any faith also benefit if religious pluralism and protection of 
minority religions are established? As my prior analysis demon-
strates, everyone gains from religious pluralism and protection of 
minority religions. The process is one that supports and energizes 
democracy, encourages free choice in all areas of society, and 
provides a framework for improvement of society. All citizens will 
benefit from this process. 
What better legacy could be left to future generations of 
Pakistanis than a truly free and open society, with no restrictions 
on choice so long as no laws are broken? These would be the 
building blocks to a society where all will have real choice and 
democratic pluralism. 
All will benefit. 
V. 
But is there evidence that protecting religious minorities’ rights 
will have a real effect on improving the lives of all citizens of 
Pakistan? A recent study by American scholars concludes that 
religious freedom has a positive impact on the strength of a nation’s 
economy.65 The study’s findings are supported by an analysis of 
data related to global economic competitiveness from the World 
Economic Forum, as compared with country data from the Pew 
Foundation on government restriction of religion and social 
hostilities related to religion.66 
	
 65. Brian J. Grim, Greg Clark, & Robert Edward Snyder, Is Religious Freedom Good for 
Business?: A Conceptual and Empirical Analysis, 10 INTERDISC. J. OF RES. ON RELIGION 1 (2014). 
 66. See generally id. 
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The data comes from twelve fields, or “pillars,” that are 
indicators of economic strength and utilized to measure global 
competitiveness. The pillars include success markers such as 
primary education and health, higher education, technological 
innovation, market efficiency and size, and business sophistication.67 
In this particular study, scholars compared these measures of 
economic competitiveness with data on governments’ restrictions 
of religion. The comparison revealed that countries with a low level 
of government restriction on religion had stronger indicators of 
global economic competitiveness in almost all of the pillars used to 
measure global competitiveness.68 For example, the pillar of “primary 
education and health” was ranked strongly for 16 percent of 
countries that had low (as compared to moderate or high) govern-
ment restrictions on religion, while no country with high government 
restrictions received a strong score in that pillar for global 
competitiveness.69 The same connection was found with technical 
training, higher education, and technological readiness.70 Overall, 
the percentage of countries with low religious hostilities or govern-
ment restriction on religion surpassed high-level religious suspension 
countries in almost every pillar of competitiveness.71 
In addition to the pillars of global competitiveness mentioned 
above, the research includes a study on the relationship between 
government restrictions on religion and economic growth, as 
measured by gross domestic product (GDP) growth per country.72 
In this study, the researchers prepared a statistical model to 
demonstrate the effects of various socio-economic factors on GDP 
growth. The model included factors such as population, monetary 
and business freedom, tax rates and burdens, inflation, and foreign 
direct investment, as well as religious restrictions. On a model 
using twenty-five of these factors, it was discovered that only five 
	
 67. Id. at 7. 
 68. Id. at 9. 
 69. Id. at 8. 
 70. Id. at 9. 
 71. Id. Measured against the pillars of macroeconomic growth and market size, the 
percentage of countries with high hostilities and government restrictions surpassed those 
countries with “low” hostilities and restrictions. The researchers conclude that this is due to 
a recent economic downturn in large Western countries, and the large market sizes in China, 
with a high level of government restriction of religion, and India, with high social hostilities. 
Id. at 11–12. 
 72. Id. at 11–14. 
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of the factors were significant as either positive or negative 
predictors of a country’s GDP growth.73 The most positive significant 
factor was previous five-year GDP growth.74 Monetary freedom and 
religious restrictions were the most significant negative predictors 
of GDP growth in 2011, the latest year of data available to the study. 
Thus, restriction on religion in a country was a better predictor of 
economic growth, or lack of growth, than were typical economic 
factors such as foreign investment, tax rates, and inflation. 
There is a great capacity for additional research in light of the 
clear statistical correlation between religious freedom and a 
country’s economic strength, and yet, standing alone, the numbers 
already reveal that bolstering religious rights and freedoms will not 
have a negative impact on global economic competitiveness or 
success, and may even have a positive effect on growth. 
VI. 
This brings me back to the Pakistan Supreme Court’s June 2014 
opinion authored by Chief Justice Jillani. He persuasively shows 
how religious minorities are protected by the constitution. So far, 
so good. But, similar to what was faced by the Supreme Court of 
the United States in Brown, there is a gap between announcement 
of the constitutional right and the reality of its application due to 
changes required in the actions of government, law enforcement 
agencies, and traditional feelings of many of the citizens. As in 
Brown, change of rights from parchment to reality requires 
government action. 
Thus, the Supreme Court of Pakistan, among other things, 
ordered that “the Federal Government should constitute a taskforce 
tasked with developing a strategy of religious tolerance,”75 and that 
curricula in schools and colleges should “promote a culture of 
religious and social tolerance”76 and discourage “hate speeches in 
social media.”77 The court also ordered “a National Council  
for [M]inorities’ [R]ights” to monitor the practical realization of  
the rights and safeguards “provided to the minorities” and “to  
	
 73. Id. at 13. 
 74. Id. 
 75. (2014) S.M.C. No. 1 of 2014 (SC) para. 37(i) (Pak.), https://www.supremecourt. 
gov.pk/downloads_judgements/smc_1_2014.pdf  
 76. Id. at para. 37(ii). 
 77. Id. at para. 37(iii). 
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frame policy recommendations for . . . the Provincial and Federal 
Government.”78 Finally, it ordered the creation of a “Special Police 
Force” to protect places of worship.79 
The court has done its job: it has found a constitutional violation. 
The court has outlined, as best it can at this time, the steps which 
must be taken by provincial and federal governments to overcome 
the constitutional violations. 
As with the U.S. Supreme Court in Brown, the Pakistan 
Supreme Court can do no more. 
Under a traditional constitutional democracy, it is now up to 
the executive and legislative branches to comply. 
VII. 
It is vital for societies and individuals to value free exercise of 
religion in our continuing effort to provide the best in the 
democratic institution. It is a topic that deserves our individual and 
joint attention. The June 2014 order from the Pakistan Supreme 
Court signals a pivotal moment in which the fundamental rights of 
religious worship and conscience may achieve their full expression 
in the country. As the Pakistan Supreme Court expressed, an 
Executive Task Force is likely needed to guide this effort through 
the cultural paradigm shift and education that will be crucial to 
lasting change. Pakistan’s efforts at this critical time will allow it to 
be a leader in a region that desperately needs an example of how 
religious pluralism can benefit society as a whole. 
 
	
 78. Id. at para. 37(iv). 
 79. Id. at para. 37(v). 
